

PSYOP A KIDNAP THAT NEVER HAPPENED!

"PERHAPS IT IS A UNIVERSAL TRUTH THAT THE LOSS OF LIBERTY AT HOME IS TO BE CHARGED TO PROVISIONS AGAINST DANGER, REAL OR PRETENDED, FROM ABROAD." — JAMES MADISON, 1798

BOKO HARAM PSYOP THE KIDNAPPING OF HUNDREDS OF SCHOOLGIRLS, THAT NEVER HAPPENED

What really happened with the Nigerian schoolgirls from Chibok?

On the night of April 14-15, 2014, at the time of the abduction, there were a total of 10 girls in the school compound, of which only seven (7) arrived in the camp of Shekau's Boko Haram.

BringBackOurGirls campaign to free Nigerian schoolgirls

Two Boko Haram and one ISWAP

Virtual leadership of terror groups

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Boko Haram PSYOP Kidnapping of Hundreds of Schoolgirls

The Kidnapping of Schoolgirls from Chibok by Shekau's Boko Haram I

News that Boko Haram kidnapped hundreds of schoolgirls from Chibok started to hit mainstream media on the day when Shekau released a statement claiming yet another bomb attack in Abuja with hundreds of victims. He didn't know about the kidnap of hundreds of schoolgirls from Chibok (ULTRASCAN HUMINT).

Bring me, cooks!

The fact is, he asked a couple of his men to get girls to do the cooking for the group. Immediately after, local witnesses confirmed that on the night of April 14-15, 2014, at the time of the abduction, there were a total of 10 girls in the school compound, of which ONLY SEVEN (7) ARRIVED IN THE CAMP OF BOKO HARAM. (ULTRASCAN HUMINT)

Abuja bombings

On April 14, 2014, at about 6:45 a.m., Explosives hidden inside vehicles detonated during morning rush hour in a bus station in Nyanya on the outskirts of Abuja. After the initial blasts, further explosions occurred as fuel tanks in nearby vehicles ignited, killing at least 88 people and injuring at least 200. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the bombing six days after it occurred—THE VIDEO RELEASED ON APRIL 19, CLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY FEATURED THE GROUP'S LEADER ABUBAKAR SHEKAU. NOT MENTIONING HUNDREDS OF KIDNAPPED SCHOOLGIRLS!







On May 2, 2014, another car bomb attack rocked the Nigerian capital.

On May 15, 2014, A British-born man Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche was arrested in Sudan on suspicion of being one of the masterminds behind the April 14 bombings in Nigeria.

Media frenzy

After Shekau prepared his statement concerning the bombing attack in Abuja, it took a couple of days for him to get informed and adjust to the magnitude of the international media frenzy about the hundreds of schoolgirls that his group supposedly kidnapped. In the weeks and months after the kidnap, he spoke in general terms about abducted girls and that he could or would sell them, but he never confirmed or claimed to have the high number of girls that his Boko Haram was supposed to have taken and held captive.





Bring Back Our Girls

On May 2, 2014, police said: "It is still unclear as to the exact number of students kidnapped." They asked parents to provide documents so an official count could be made, "as school records are damaged in the attack."

On May 4, the Nigerian President, GOODLUCK JONATHAN, spoke publicly about the kidnapping for the first time, saying the government was doing everything it could to find the missing girls. At the same time, he BLAMED PARENTS FOR NOT SUPPLYING ENOUGH INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR MISSING CHILDREN TO THE POLICE.

Also, PRESIDENT BUHARI was reluctant to make a fuzz about the kidnap until forced to react by the international community, and the investigation eventually turned into a search for hundreds of kidnapped girls. After years of a still-ongoing search, President Buhari, or his wife Aisha, who uses any media attention to better position herself, proudly presented the families of 5 (five) of the girls abducted from the school compound in Chibok.





Only found families of 5 missing girls

They were calling for family members to report and confirm that their daughter, sister, niece, or even a close friend was missing. Many made extensive efforts to find and verify the high number of hundreds of kidnapped schoolgirls. No one, the government, reporters, detectives, found more than the families of the same five girls.





#BringBackOurGirls campaign to free Nigerian schoolgirls

The kidnapping of the Nigerian schoolgirls has ignited a viral social media campaign that has brought renewed attention to Boko Haram's campaign of violence, and protests around the world

telegraph.co.uk - #BBOG campaign Pictures



On Wednesday, May 7, 2014, Michelle Obama added her voice to worldwide calls for the safe return of the girls. The First Lady tweeted: 'Our prayers are with the missing Nigerian girls and their families. It's time to #BringBackOurGirls." The tweet was signed "-mo," indicating that she sent it herself.Picture: @FLOTUS CREDIT: @FLOTUS



On May 10, 2014 Pope Francis also backed the campaign on Twitter calling for followers to pray for the girls' releasePicture: AFP | CREDIT: AFP





y 11, 2014 David Cameron Joined CNN's Chief International Correspondent Christiane Amanpour to support the social media campaignto free '6 schoolgirls kidnapped in Nigeria. During The Andrew Marr show the Prime Minister said he did not rule out the possibility that British troops be used to help rescue the girls.Picture: Jeff Overs/BBC | CREDIT: Jeff Overs/BBC





The Two Boko Haram and ISWAP

Boko Haram-Shekau (BH1), Boko Haram-Nur/Barnawi (BH2) and ISWAP



Shekau in front of a virtual green screen, recorded outside Nigeria for PSYOP.

In 2009 not a single Nigerian believed that Nigerians could be real terrorists and the insane possibility of Nigerian suicide bombers was referred to the lunatic asylum

Boko Haram- Abubakar Shekau (BH1)

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited a series of African countries revealing the focus of the U.S. African Agenda. "Any obstacle that the AL Qaida network faces in its effort to achieve its mission statement, the AL Qaida terror network identifies as a threat" The travels of Rice in Africa revealed that the U.S. would create such obstacles in this for the Al Qaida terror network vital continent. (2008)

Al Qaeda messaged their network to support the Muslim minorities, send imams, offer Koran studies, and donate to refurbish existing and build new Mosques in Sub Sahara Countries. (ULTRASCAN HUMINT)



Al Qaeda travelers from Europe (messengers) met with leaders of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram to offer substantial support and measure their willingness and capabilities to join the international jihad. The group commissioned studies to identify the social, and economic weaknesses and strengths in East and West African countries. Local organized crime businesses were approached for their experience in facilitating trafficking and money laundering. (ULTRASCAN HUMINT)

The travelers reported that Al Shabaab wasn't capable, and the leader of Boko Haram wasn't willing.

In 2009 **Mohammed Yusuf**, the leader of Boko Haram, was killed and replaced by **Abubakar Shekau** (*Abu Mohammed Abubakar bin Mohammad al-Sheikawi*). The small group was annexed and purged. (Maman Nur from Cameroon was seen as a risk and separated into Ansaru, with different rules of engagement) It befitted Al Qaeda's new policy, "Think Global, Act Local," and went fast forward with Phase I of the GSI doctrine, establishing fear and presence in Nigeria, by random killings. (ULTRASCAN HUMINT)

A strong GSI doctrine: Generic, Specific, International

- 1.1 Phase I Generic: Generic effective 'guerrilla marketing' by killing at random to establish presence and fear.
- 1.2 Phase II Specific: Attack Specific targets linked to the mission of Boko Haram 'all Western influence is forbidden,' such as educational institutions, schools, and universities.
- 1.3 Phase III International: Attacks in Europe/U.K. and other regions where Boko Haram and specific targets have a presence. Niger, Cameroon, Chad

Rules of engagement - Narratives

The rules of engagement are aligned with the GSI doctrine. The narratives only allow for one-way communications and forbid two-way, which might reveal their locations. Therefore no actions that require an answer, thus no negotiations and no kidnappings for ransom!

Funding, supply chain, training of fighters, and P.R. are foreign organized.

Ultrascan HUMINT operations code name 'Deep Cycle' continues to reveal specific objectives.



Shekau in front of a virtual green screens, recorded outside Nigeria for PSYOP











Boko Haram Nur/Barnawi (BH2)

Boko Haram projects itself as an organization fighting for the greater good. In reality, similar to al-Qaeda or ISIS, it is also a name that different groups (can) hide behind and attach themselves to the Boko Haram 'brand' or rather, their P.R. infrastructure. It does not take a brilliant mind to think of ways to exploit this system. In Nigeria, stakeholders have enemies, and competitors are incredibly determined.

From 2009, attack after attack Boko Haram established a presence and fear. Initially, not a single Nigerian believed that Nigerians could ever be terrorists. At first, the government handled it like most problems, denied the existence of a threat, and later tried to initiate talks or pretended to be negotiating. All are facilitated by Politicians who control the media and the Editorial Boards.

But once the government used its P.R. machine to boast about successes in its fight against the terrorists, Boko Haram retaliated with more attacks and released statements that proved the government was lying, thus taking control over the news cycles initially initiated by the government.

For years the government was at a complete loss, and it took the military until 2015 to become a somewhat worthy adversary of Boko Haram-BH1. Until then, the many failed attempts to stop Boko Haram-BH1 were cause for several strategic and tactical reviews. If nothing else works, the most successful counter-narrative is to fight the enemy from within or if that's not possible to create a copy. As Boko Haram proved not easy to find and impregnable for undercovers or spies, this is where a copy of Boko Haram-BH2 comes in.



Since 2012 the Nigerian Military made some efforts to simulate Boko Haram's actions. The government goal for Boko Haram (BH2) was first to regain a firm hold over their beloved news cycles, second to use the brand to its advantage, and last but not least, to get access to other international groups. The latter would theoretically earn them a place at the global C.T. intelligence table. However, their version of Boko Haram-BH2

from 2012 was not a success. Mistakes were abundant, and Nigeria's BH2 operation was the laughingstock in the intelligence world.

That said, their efforts between 2015 and 2018 had a more solid basis. Today, Boko Haram BH2 is not top-notch but fully operational under the brands of Boko Haram (BH2) and ISWAP. It can claim and keep the news cycle when it sees fit and act in ways that the original Boko Haram BH1 does not. Thus, diverting blame from themselves onto Boko Haram BH1, and mostly, unsuspecting groups of people who flock to the Boko Haram 'ideals'. Leaving the real and more skilled/intelligent perpetrators in the dark behind the shadow of Boko Haram where crime becomes ideology!

That leaves the imagination to wander. Was it an attack on the work of a competitor? Foreign Intelligence Service? Terror group? Or was it the group that has been working under the Boko Haram name in the past? Nigeria's military created "Boko Haram 2" (BH2).

Government and Boko Haram2 synchronized statements

Since 2009 there have been many P.R. attempts to undermine the leadership of Shekau's Boko Haram BH1, indiscriminately echoed by analysts and media. In a more recent P.R. attempt, the statements of BH2 and the government were synchronized and somewhat better substantiated.





Both announced that not the leader of Ansaru, Mamman Nur, but Abu Musab al-Barnawi (BH2) was the new leader of Boko Haram replacing Shekau (BH1), and they recruited fighters for BH2 from (not limited to!) captured members of BH1 in prison. Few actual results in the realm of terrorism speak for al-Barnawi,

allegedly the son of Mohammed Yusuf.



ISWAP – an additional brand for foreign fighters



In support of the global jihad, the ISWAP brand "coordinates" the inflow of experienced foreign fighters once they arrive via North Africa, Mali, and **Burkina Faso**. (H)(T) Mamman Nur (from Cameroon) is linked with al Qaeda training facilities and the Islamic State (ISIS terrorism tactics as criminal method), which is an illegal war and P.R. machine but strategically weaker than al Qaeda. AL QAIDA'S LEADING WORK IN AFRICA WAS TO BUILD AN EXTENSIVE BASE OF LOCAL SUPPORT IN GROWING MUSLIM COMMUNITIES OF SUB SAHARA AFRICA — EVENTUALLY TO HAVE CONTROL OVER THE JIHADIST. Next to that, it maintains training camps in strategic locations from Sudan to South Africa. (H)(T).



The kidnapping of Dapchi schoolgirls by Boko Haram BH2

During the evening of Monday, February 19, 2018. Presumably, fighters of Boko Haram arrived in the town of Dapchi, Yobe State. They headed for the Government Girls Science and Technical College, fleeing a little while later. Initially, officials said that no one was missing. But a week later, authorities admitted "the Islamist extremists" took 110 schoolgirls. So, what exactly was going on?

Families insisted their daughters were missing

Officials and reporters verified the number of 105 kidnapped schoolgirls by getting confirmation from family members that their daughter, sister, or niece was missing.



A video surfaced on the internet, allegedly of the captured girls all in stainless garments, keeping alive the news surrounding the kidnap in the media and allowing the government to comment.

Five weeks later, 101 schoolgirls were released and found by the side of a road. A Christian girl remained captive.

The Federal Government reported that The "Boko Haram terrorist group" rejected the ransom offered to secure the release of Leah Sharibu.

The Shadow Where Crime Becomes Ideology - Al Qaeda ISIS

Al Qaeda projects itself as an organization fighting for the greater good. In reality, it is nothing more than a name that different groups (can) hide behind and attach themselves to the Al Qaeda 'brand' or its PR infrastructure.

Not only is Al Qaeda very good at PR, but they also piggyback off of other movements to gain attention and new members.

Proxies - instruments of war

It does not take a brilliant mind to think of ways this system can be exploited by organizations with enemies and highly determined competitors. If any of those enemies were to attack their competitor, they would not have any good way of doing that without outing themselves as the culprit.

This is where Al Qaeda comes in. Thus, diverting blame from themselves and onto largely unsuspecting groups of people who flock to the Al Qaeda 'ideals'. These people, or scapegoats rather, are the ones who read about (these Al Qaeda) 'attacks' and decide to join in by connecting to their network and launching attacks on Al Qaeda targets. They are the ones who are eventually caught, leaving the actual and more skilled/intelligent perpetrators in the dark behind the Al Qaeda shadow where crime becomes ideology!

This then leaves the imagination to wander. Was an attack the work of a competitor? Foreign Intelligence Service? Terror group? Or was it just a group working under the Al Qaeda name in the past?

To answer this question will take someone more in the know.

In The Know

Ultrascan-AGI HUMINT invests significant time and (AML) resources to capture concepts, costs, and operating expenses for criminal networks with <u>rhizomatic dynamics</u>. Where there is no unity or centralized structure, social, ideological, and criminal cross-border networks of anonymous perpetrators share knowledge and resources.

Ultrascan has, through its HUMINT network of 'feet in the street' access to reliable primary sources, individuals that support the development of (potential) affiliates of Al Qaeda for "good use." But also still unknown groups that have been there for more than a decade as a steering committee that induces the **Al Qaeda Value Pyramid** for affiliates. This access was developed to create a high level of trust in face-to-face meetings.

Primitive militia holed up in the wilderness or jungle?

Terror attacks are often portrayed as an incident with little preparation or coordination, the image of the Islamist group as a primitive militia, disenfranchised, marginalized, and estranged from society, holed up in the wilderness, jungle, or backstreets of the cosmopolitan cities. Dreaming about the mission and vision but lacking the capabilities and skills to plan attacks that meet a strategy's and military doctrine's requirements.

Or professionals executing international plots?

Only when more attackers seem to be able to cause carnage that claims the attention of international media for days in a row and murder people in plain sight. Only then does one start to wonder about the level and coordinated planning those attacks have, and if such a scale of preparation can be detected and prevented.

Al Qaeda "The Base", detected but never eradicated

Al Qaeda "The Base", as in connections that go back to the 90s and developed into the past decade. Building informal relationships and human networks, one of the most important of which was formed around bin Laden in the 1980s and 1990s.

Counter-terrorism operations launched after 9/11 show that detection takes an enormous investment in Techint and deep cycle undercover operations. Traditional mechanics of terror groups proved no longer effective due to the advanced monitoring possibilities of the intelligence services (NSA, Echelon) and widely infiltrated Mosques. The operations were successful but did not go unnoticed, forcing 'The Base' to change methods, minimize their use of infrastructure, and move their leadership from Europe to less technologically advanced countries, thus staying under the radar of government agencies.

Al Qaeda's "The Base" was never eradicated because the WOT was the WOTF "War On Terror Figureheads and Virtual Leaders" with a focus on thought leaders like Usama bin Laden and the AfPak region. *Allowing unchecked growth of the international funding and support network.*

The complexity of cross-continent high-profile attacks by Al Qaeda Affiliates

Anti-money laundering investigations (Ultrascan-AGI, 2007-2013) link the initial funding to support more complex cross-continent attacks by Al Qaeda's affiliates. The new (re-) acquired organizations like LeT, Al Shabab, Al Nusra, Boko Haram, ISIS, and groups that have not yet (re-) captured the eye of the global media today. For example, the Mumbai attacks ended at the Taj Mahal Hotel, the UN building in Abuja, the US embassy in Benghazi, and the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi.

The complexity is then defined by (preparatory and coordinating) acts abroad, foreign participation, and professional knowledge of security measures at the target.

What does that look like let's have a view to a kill and map the international communications in the days leading up to such a high-profile terror attack in Dakar, Senegal.

Narrative of a genuine three-month counter-terror operation

A context of intelligence operations

The secret services are the only real measure of a nation's political health. The one true expression of its subconscious

Since 2007 the intelligence services prepared for a significant shift in real US geo-policy, military power, and intelligence.

An essential part of that shift, leaving war zones and decreasing its military presence in partner countries, occurs. Allocated financial DoD resources show that what remains are substantial special operations (US-SOCOM) [..] a prioritized global monitor function facilitated by big tech. [..]

Good stories spell the end of an era

The Anglo-American security and intelligence relationship from the Second World War to the present day roughly divides the world between them and exchanging the material recorded. The US and UK 'saved themselves a great deal of money and trouble and continue to do so in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Nine Eyes Denmark, France, The Netherlands, and Norway participate as third parties. And Fourteen Eyes is an arrangement between SIGINT agencies.

Non-Western intelligence-sharing alliances include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization between China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Intelligence is no longer centralized

The alphabet soup has been politicized for decades and should not be trusted by anyone. Most of these organizations have become political pawns serving the interests of one party or another. As politics has "unwittingly" become part of transnational organized crime, yes, it is very much Third World and wholly unacceptable. Also, the scope of Special Operations and Classified Programs is no longer limited to foreign soil.

The Central and the Defense Intelligence were prohibited from working inside their home countries, but nowadays, they use their instruments as if it was on foreign soil. A long time ago, they could say they only worked inside their country in the Diaspora of other countries, like Somalia, to use it there. Or to make money without oversight, with fraud and other crimes. Every time they said it was for a good cause, but now the limits are gone. They work inside their homelands to control and influence the population with a broad scope of fear narratives, visions, and missions.

NOTES

Virtual leadership of terror PSYOPS

Haji Forqan Mulah Omar Mullah Hibatullah Colonel Halimov Bagram airforce base Shekau

Haji Forqan

* for months, It was rumored that Haji Forqan was killed and replaced by a mirror image. **Resolved - Photo of Haji Forqan**. **in Pul-e-Khumri, Baghlan, taken on date: 28_4_2022**

Mullah Omar

* Mullah Omar died before 2003 and was replaced by a creative virtual narrative.

Mullah Hibatullah

* It seems the figurehead Mullah Hibatullah is part of a similar narrative.

Colonel Gulmurod Halimov

* Fabricated for narrative - former commander of the Special Forces of Tajikistan, joined the Islamic State (IS) in Syria, in May 2015. Halimov had a significant following inside Tajikistan as well as Russia. Even though he has been reported killed several times, the Tajik authorities rejected those reports. Halimov's name remained on the UN Security Council's sanctions list. Starting with a fictional visit to Kabul on August 25, 2021, the intelligence department of the Haqqani Taliban and ISI fabricated reports of Halimov's meetings in Afghanistan with high-ranking Taliban and leaders of ISIS. On Saturday, August 27 2022 his remains were released.

Bagram airforce base

* Some time after Kabul's fall, fuel and lubrication are delivered at Bagram airport to over one hundred "contractors" who are serviced by a group of 300 third-tier workers from India. In part protected by Badri forces from the Haqqani network. While another part of the airport is protected by fighters from the Quetta Council.

Abu Mohammed Abubakar al-Sheikawi (Shekau)

* was a Kanuri terrorist who was the leader of Boko Haram, a Nigerian Islamist militant group from 2009 to 2021. He served as deputy leader to the group's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, until Yusuf's execution in 2009. His media presence was limited to sound recordings and video in front of a green screen, often reading significant parts of his messages from paper.

Lost in translation

* some of the content comes directly from sources that use automatic translations, which can lead to incomprehensible English sentences.

'Deep Cycle' Intelligence DELIVERABLES

Ultrascan HUMINT operations code name 'Deep Cycle' continues to reveal specific objectives of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and its affiliates.

- 1) strategy
- 2) execution framework
- 3) long-term target focus
- 4) short-term hit list
- 5) modus operandi regarding operations
- 6) communications regarding activities
- 7) movements within the region
- 8) hideouts
- 9) agents
- 10) financing sources
- 11) infiltration methods within the Public sector
- 12) Assessment of suspected supporters within organizations/ agencies
- 13) disruption activity capabilities (limited to local activities)
- 14) strategy alignment with cross-border affiliates
- 15) (virtual) leadership focus assessment

For any other ISIS and Al Qaeda special projects in Africa, South Asia, and Central Asia countries additional charges apply to specific HUMINT on request, case by case.

FIX THIS

The enemy appears driven and motivated by something other than ideology or funding. Every one of these events (could have) occurred as a result of a failure of imagination. The job is not to predict tomorrow based on yesterday. That's what academics do. The task is to prevent the end of tomorrow by using your brains and your imagination. If you don't identify and find the threat before it's too late, you might be held responsible for the single largest intelligence fumble since a flight instruction school in Florida failed to grasp the significance of a 19-year-old Al-Qaeda terrorist saying he didn't need to learn how to land.

Some paid advice

Ultimately, one can find them all to be human failures.

But suppose you believe that wars and insurgencies resulted from intelligence failures, or even worse, a lack of strategy. In that case, consider yourself lucky because nobody will tell you their actual military strategy and intelligence policies for you only to have an opinion. No, you are at the receiving end of a successful strategy and intelligence narrative.

A context of intelligence operations

Since 2007 the intelligence services prepared for a significant shift in real US geo-policy, military power, and intelligence.

An essential part of that shift, leaving war zones and decreasing its military presence in partner countries, occurs. It is explicitly cutting off Iran, Pakistan, and Israel. Allocated financial DoD resources show that what remains are substantial special operations (in Africa) (US-SOCOM) [..] a prioritized global monitor function. [..]

Why HUMINT

Why do we need secret agents? Isn't it all rather quaint? Is it that we see a different, more frightening world than you do?

Our enemies are no longer nations and do not exist on a map but are non-state actors and unknown individuals. Look around you, who do you fear? Can you see a face, a uniform, a flag? No. Yet, before breakfast in their pajamas, they can do more damage from their laptops than an intelligence agent can during a year in the field. Online organized crime doesn't know law and order, has a Wild West mentality and is lawless to the core. Anarchy.

While transparency became fashionable in the West, the world is not more transparent now. Today it's more opaque, in the shadows, and that's where we do battle. So, before you declare that irrelevant, ask yourselves, how safe do you feel?

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<u>Imminent Terror Alerts! update October 06 2022</u>

\$36B Imposter Fraud - Undetectable - Foreign election Interference!?

Nigerian Crime Rigged the US Presidential Elections

NIGERIA THE SPLIT

AL QAEDA, ISIS AND THE TALIBAN Oct 10 2022

Al Qaeda and ISIS Contact list - TOP SECRET - update Sep 27 2022 UNREDACTED

Day-report Attack Russian Embassy Kabul intelligence Sep 06 2022

Alert - Al Qaeda ISIS - targets revealed in the ME - East and West Africa and Asia

THANK YOU AMERICA - ISIS black flag returns to Afghanistan April 2022

Foreign Terrorists Play Key Role in Wars March 2022

AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN INTELLIGENCE STRATEGIES, INSURGENCIES Feb 2022

Monitored LEADERS, FOREIGN FIGHTERS, SPIES IN AFPAK Dec 2021-Jan 2022

TOP SECRET - Al Qaeda ISIS list AfPak region Dec 2021 2022

Generals of Iran and Pakistan met with Taliban after fall of Kabul - Afghanistan

The Only Way To Fight Crime , Full Spectrum Analytics - Rethinking Intelligence

Gain of Function Virus Research BSL-4 - The Naïve Scientist

INTELLIGENCE WARS - Game On a Perfect Storm

The Attack On Iran

AfDB Annual Meetings Escape Deadly Massacre

Flawed, yet actionable into Full Lockdown - Corona Nuclear WMD Fear Narratives

Al Qaeda increased support for attacks by Boko Haram and al Shabaab

Beirut's Storage of Solid Fuel Missile Propellant Exploded

CRISIS PHASE II: SYSTEM COLAPSE - China - Iran Threat In US

CRISIS TIPPING POINT

Nigeria Security and Criminal Minds

Plots to Assassinate Heads of States

Terrorist nuclear threat in Europe

Nigerians in Diaspora call for revolution and to kill politicians and family on foreign soil.

Nigerian Fraud Funding Politicians, "Movements" and "Terror groups" Update August 2019

<u>Ultrascan-FIU AML Intelligence Briefing May 2019 - The true cost of money laundering!</u>

An existentialist threat to Europe and the US - Counter Terrorism Proposal

Al Qaeda Threat to Rwanda - Puts a Bulls-Eye on South Korean Techies in Africa

Banks in Africa under attack by extremist who seek to disrupt

Iran Threat Inside - IRGC Loopholes to Bypass financial sanctions Update July 03, 2019

Barcelona Imminent Attack - Warning June 26th 2017

How do you recognize an al-Qaeda fighter from Iran?

Iran, No Choice Left ... But Attack - If provoked (!?) - Update June 21 2019

2017 Global Islamic Terrorism Surge

The battle has just begun - Boko Haram

Al Qaeda technical cyber attack skills and top notch capabilities

The Niger Delta Avengers and Nigeria

The Airport Nexus Crime Terrorism

Al Qaeda's Africa Kill List - terror reaches Africa

Iran, Sanctions Lifted and Lower Oil Price Risky Business

ISIS - Comes To You!

Muslim Versus Non-Muslim, Migrant Versus Native -Terrorism

FEAR BASED NARRATIVES - Leading the Public - CHILDREN of AUSTERITY - into Emergency Mode

Concerted efforts to inflict immediate, radical, economic and political change, the Prelude to (civil)

Wars

Cargo Bicycle Frames Bomb Threat - alert Feb. 2014 - Dec. 2015

ISIS Sets Off Cold War - Terrorist aim to strike at the heart of Russia Egypt relations

How Terrorist Converge with Refugees Crisis

The Hunt for ISIS Electronic Footprints in The Cloud

Cybercrime a Source of Funding Terrorism

Radical Change of Course - Boko Haram Strategy update April 16

Case: Taliban Global Revenues Money Laundering

Money Transfer Agents Operated by Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism

Al Qaeda Affiliates Plan a Mumbai Style Attack in Africa

Complexity of High Profile Attacks by Al Qaeda Affiliates

Narrative of a Genuine 3 Months Counter-Terror Operation

Al Qaeda Communications In Days Leading Up To An Attack in Dakar Senegal Afrika

419 AFF Suicides Undermining Trust and Mercilessly Exploiting Humans for Financial Gain

419 Advance Fee Fraud Statistics 2013 Released in July 2014

Boko Haram "The Movement" Plans To Trigger Uprising

Boko Haram, Biggest Issue for Africa Since Colonialism: The broader Notion!

Al Qaeda Nigerian Affiliate Boko Haram Plans Attacks

Layers of Funding and Support of Al Qaeda's New Affiliates in Africa

Al Qaeda Synergy between Crime and Ideology

Preparations for Attacks in Rwanda and Uganda, in Timeline of Westgate

Hezbollah Counterfeit Pharma - 'Undetectable' Explosives in prescription Medicine

Libyan Nationals Funding Terrorism on US Soil

Boko Haram Aims To Strike in Abuja in June 2012 Targeting Goodluck Jonathan

Crisis in Western Intelligence Agencies Crucial For Public Safety and Security

Boko Haram the Next Al Qaeda GSI Phase - Imminent Threat - Funding

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